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Regina	v	John	Terry:	The	Discursive	Construction	of	an	Alleged	Racist	Event	
	
Abstract	
	
This	article	explores	the	conformation	in	discourse	of	a	verbal	exchange	and	its	
subsequent	mediatised	and	legal	ramifications.	The	event	concerns	an	allegedly	
racist	insult	directed	by	high	profile	English	professional	footballer	John	Terry	
towards	another	player,	Anton	Ferdinand,	during	a	televised	match	in	October	
2011.	The	substance	of	Terry’s	utterance,	which	included	the	noun	phrase	‘fucking	
black	cunt’,	was	found	by	a	Chief	Magistrate	not	to	be	a	racist	insult,	although	the	
fact	that	these	actual	words	were	framed	within	the	utterance	was	not	in	dispute.	
The	upshot	of	this	ruling	was	that	Terry	was	acquitted	of	a	racially	aggravated	
public	order	offence.	A	subsequent	investigation	by	the	regulatory	commission	of	
the	English	Football	Association	(FA)	ruled,	almost	a	year	after	the	event,	that	
Terry	was	guilty	of	racially	abusing	Ferdinand.	Terry	was	banned	for	four	matches	
and	fined	£220,000.		
	
It	is	our	contention	that	this	event,	played	out	in	legal	rulings,	social	media	and	
print	and	broadcast	media,	constitutes	a	complex	web	of	linguistic	structures	and	
strategies	in	discourse,	and	as	such	lends	itself	well	to	analysis	with	a	broad	range	
of	tools	from	pragmatics,	discourse	analysis	and	cognitive	linguistics.	Amongst	
other	things,	such	an	analysis	can	help	explain	the	seemingly	anomalous	‐	even	
contradictory	‐	position	adopted	in	the	legal	ruling	with	regard	to	the	speech	act	
status	of	‘fucking	black	cunt’;	namely,	that	the	racist	content	of	the	utterance	was	
not	contested	but	that	the	speaker	was	found	not	to	have	issued	a	racist	insult.	
Over	its	course,	the	article	addresses	this	broader	issue	by	making	reference	to	the	
systemic‐functional	interpersonal	function	of	language,	particularly	to	the	
concepts	of	modality,	polarity	and	modalisation.	It	also	draws	on	models	of	verbal	
irony	from	linguistic	pragmatics,	notably	from	the	theory	of	irony	as	echoic	
mention	(c.f.	Sperber	and	Wilson,	1981;	Wilson	and	Sperber,	1992).	Furthermore,	
the	article	makes	use	of	the	cognitive‐linguistic	framework,	Text	World	Theory	(c.f.	
Gavins,	2007;	Werth,	1999)	to	examine	the	discourse	positions	occupied	by	key	
actors	and	adapts,	from	cognitive	poetics,	the	theory	of	mind‐modelling	(c.f.	
Stockwell,	2009)	to	explore	the	conceptual	means	through	which	these	actors	
discursively	negotiate	the	event.		
	
It	is	argued	that	the	pragmatic	and	cognitive	strategies	that	frame	the	entire	
incident	go	a	long	way	towards	mitigating	the	impact	of	so	ostensibly	stark	an	act	
of	racial	abuse.	Moreover,	it	is	suggested	here	that	the	reconciliation	of	Terry’s	
action	was	a	result	of	the	confluence	of	strategies	of	discourse	with	relations	of	
power	as	embodied	by	the	media,	the	law	and	perceptions	of	nationhood	
embraced	by	contemporary	football	culture.	It	is	further	proposed	that	the	
outcome	of	this	episode,	where	the	FA	was	put	in	the	spotlight,	and	where	both	the	
conflict	and	its	key	antagonists	were	‘intranational’,	was	strongly	impelled	by	the	
institution	of	English	football	and	its	governing	body	both	to	reproduce	and	
maintain	social,	cultural	and	ethnic	cohesion	and	to	avoid	any	sense	that	the	event	
featured	a	discernable	‘out‐group’.	
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Keywords	
	
	
Introduction	
On	Sunday	the	23rd	of	October	2011,	English	Premier	League	football	teams	
Chelsea	and	Queen’s	Park	Rangers	(QPR)	met	at	Loftus	Road,	the	home	ground	of	
the	latter	club.	The	score	of	that	match	faded	into	insignificance	in	the	face	of	an	
angry	exchange	between	the	Chelsea	player,	John	Terry,	and	the	QPR	player	Anton	
Ferdinand.	Then	captain	of	both	Chelsea	and	the	English	national	side,	Terry	
uttered	words	that	(incontrovertibly)	included	the	phrase	‘fucking	black	cunt’	
(Riddle,	2012:	2).	An	allegation	that	Terry	had	committed	a	racially	aggravated	
public	order	offence	was	referred	to	the	London	Westminster	Magistrates’	Court	
(LWMC),	the	deliberations	from	which	were	published	in	July	of	2012.	The	Chief	
Magistrate,	Howard	Riddle,	found	in	favour	of	Terry,	although	a	subsequent	non‐
criminal	investigation	by	the	Regulatory	Commission	of	the	English	Football	
Association	later	ruled,	in	September	of	the	same	year,	that	Terry	was	guilty	of	
racially	abusing	Ferdinand	(The	Football	Association	and	John	George	Terry	
[FAJGT],	2012:	62).	Terry	was	then	banned	for	four	matches	and	fined	£220,000.	
Our	analysis	focuses	on	the	written	legal	rulings	by	both	magistrate	Riddle	and	by	
the	FA’s	Regulatory	Commission.	We	offer	comments	on	the	discursive	frame	that	
embraces	this	event	and	on	the	progression	and	shift	in	discourse	between	both	
rulings.	Where	relevant,	we	comment	on	the	television	footage	as	it	intersects	with	
the	legal	rulings,	but	we	make	no	evaluative	assessment	of	procedures	of	law	or	of	
the	court	proceedings	that	form	the	legal	underpinnings	of	this	event.	In	particular,	
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we	do	not	contest,	nor	imply	any	contestation,	of	the	legally	binding	judgments	of	
both	the	FA	Commission	and	the	Westminster	Magistrate’s	Court.	
Footage	of	the	episode,	often	in	edited	or	in	scatological	manipulations	of	
the	original	visual	text,	exists	on	the	internet	and	readers	of	the	present	article	can	
easily	find	it	at	several	locations	on	the	web.	Obviously,	the	footage	was	made	
available	at	both	hearings,	and	the	recordings	formed	‘a	central	part	of	the	
evidence’	(Riddle,	2012:	1).	The	encounter	between	the	two	players	on	the	field	
lasted	approximately	40	seconds	in	real	time,	with	Terry’s	contentious	utterance	
taking	6	seconds,	although	at	a	key	moment	the	view	of	Terry’s	face	is	obscured	by	
the	movement	of	teammate	Ashley	Cole	across	the	screen.	Figure	1	is	a	line	
drawing	depicting	Terry	as	he	directs	his	utterance,	leftwards	on	screen,	towards	
an	out‐of‐shot	Ferdinand.	This	is	the	moment	just	before	Ashley	Cole,	in	the	
foreground,	moves	in	between	the	camera	and	Terry.		
	
	Figure	1:	John	Terry	and	Ashley	Cole	
INSERT	FIGURE	1	AS	CLOSE	TO	HERE	AS	POSSIBLE	
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What	was	alleged	to	have	been	uttered	during	the	brief	obscured	sequence	
was	speculated	upon	at	both	hearings.	Evidence	from	three	professional	lip	
readers	was	considered	at	the	LWMC	hearing,	and	agreement	was	reached	about	
the	words	that	could	be	read	from	the	footage.	These	were:	
‘Yeah	and	I	[short	obstruction	by	Cole]	you	/	ya	fucking	black	cunt	[pause]	
fucking	knobhead’	
	
Significantly,	the	lip	readers	were	unable	to	comment	on	tone	of	voice	or,	in	the	
magistrate’s	words,	on	how	the	words	were	said	(Riddle,	2012:	4,	our	emphasis).		
Our	initial	analytic	focus	is	precisely	on	the	issue	of	how	these	words	were	
said.	Moreover,	a	significant	part	of	both	defence	and	prosecution	evidence	was	
implicitly	orientated	towards	interpretation	of	speakers’	and	hearers’	
understanding	of	utterances,	although	obviously	none	of	the	parties	involved	in	
this	interpretation	articulated,	through	any	rigorous	model	of	discourse	
pragmatics,	the	strategies	of	language	they	were	probing	or	contesting.	It	is	our	
position	therefore	that	the	toolkits	of	pragmatics,	cognitive	linguistics,	and	critical	
discourse	analysis	are	well‐equipped	to	‘unpack’	this	discursive	event.	The	present	
study	furthermore	complements	a	growing	body	of	research	that	explores	the	
intersections	between	language,	discourse	and	sport.	This	research	includes,	for	
example,	Adetunji’s	(2013)	analysis	of	the	interactive	strategies	used	among	
groups	of	football	fans,	McDowell	and	Schaffner’s	(2011)	study	of	gendered	
discourse	in	a	reality	TV	sport	show,	or	Bishop	and	Jaworski’s	(2003)	exploration	
of	the	print	and	broadcast	reception	of	a	football	game	between	Germany	and	
England	in	2000.	Given	the	constraints	posed	by	participant	observation,	
explorations	of	on‐field	linguistic	interaction	are	rare,	although	Meân	(2001)	was	
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able	to	explore	gender	identities	through	recordings	of	the	on‐field	officials	in	both	
men’s	and	women’s	football	matches.	Our	overall	theoretical	stance	aligns	well	
with	the	position	adopted	by	Meân	and	Halone	(2010:	passim)	both	on	the	
legitimacy	of	the	many	interconnections	between	sport,	language,	and	culture	and	
on	the	social	and	cultural	significance	of	these	interconnections	as	a	site	for	
scholarly	theory	and	research.	Where	the	present	study,	it	is	hoped,	makes	an	
original	contribution	is	through	its	synthesis	of	discourse	analysis	and	judicial	
ruling,	all	of	which	is	set	in	the	context	of	the,	as	noted,	relatively	rare	on‐field	
linguistic	data.	
The	first	step	in	this	analysis	involves	postulating	three	pragmatic	
strategies	that	might	offer	different	accounts	of	the	speech	act	status	of	Terry’s	
controversial	utterance,	the	raw	linguistic	elements	of	which	are	uncontested.	The	
central	paradox,	we	have	suggested,	lies	in	the	use	of	racist	words	by	a	speaker	
who	is	subsequently	deemed	by	law	not	to	have	issued	a	racist	insult.	Put	another	
way,	one	might	question	how	a	participant	in	one	discourse‐world	(see	Gavins,	
2007:	18‐34)	is	assessed	by	participants	in	another	discourse‐world,	in	such	a	way	
that	the	LWMC	hearing	legally	‘set	aside’	the	interpretation	that	Terry’s	utterance	
at	Loftus	Road	was	directly	and	unequivocally	threatening,	abusive	and	insulting.	
From	our	perspective,	then,	only	three	possible,	and	largely	mutually	exclusive,	
interpretations	in	discourse	remain:	(i)	that	the	eclipsed	segment	contains	an	
explicit	denial;	(ii)	that	the	utterance	as	a	whole	is	an	attempt	at	banter;	(iii)	that	
by	violating	the	pragmatic	condition	of	sincerity,	the	utterance	as	a	whole	is	
intended	ironically.	The	‘denial’	postulate	assumes	that	the	missing	chunk	is	
something	like	‘never	called’,	such	that	Terry	offers	a	rejection	of	an	earlier	charge	
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of	racist	abuse	from	Ferdinand:	that	is,	‘I	never	called	you	/	ya	black	cunt’.	The	
pronoun	to	the	right	of	the	inserted	sequence	now	becomes	more	of	an	issue,	and	
interestingly,	its	status	was	disputed	by	counsel	in	the	LWMC	hearing.	Two	of	the	
lip	readers	agreed	that	they	might	be	mistaken	and	‘that	“you/	ya”	may	be	“a”	or	
indeed	a	number	of	other	similar	sounds’	(Riddle,	2012:	4).	In	short,	defence	
counsel	contended	that	‘ya’	was	‘a’,	prosecution	counsel	that	it	was	‘you’.	Clearly,	
the	assumed	speech	act	status	of	Terry’s	utterance	will	be	altered	accordingly,	
where	the	former	construction,	with	its	indefinite	article,	suggests	perhaps	a	
statement	of	generality,	while	the	latter,	with	its	second	person	direct	address,	
intimates	a	vocative	formula	aimed	squarely	at	his	discourse‐world	co‐participant,	
Ferdinand.	However,	the	‘never	called’	scenario	was	played	out	largely	in	the	social	
media	and	video	sites	that	went	‘viral’	subsequent	to	the	day	of	the	match.	Battle	
lines	were	drawn,	predictably,	in	line	with	club	affiliation,	and	unsurprisingly	the	
‘never	called’	explanation	appealed	most	to	supporters	of	Chelsea	Football	Club.	
What	is	important	is	that	the	Chief	Magistrate	foreclosed	on	speculation	thus:	
‘There	are	missing	words	and	I	have	not	been	prepared	to	speculate	as	to	what	
they	may	be’	(Riddle,	2012:	5).	The	broader	issue	this	raises,	where	Terry	may	be	
responding	in	some	sense	to	an	implied	utterance	from	Ferdinand,	will	be	taken	up	
further	below.		
The	second	postulate	is	that	the	utterance	is	intended	as	banter.	This	
pragmatic	strategy,	alongside	teasing,	inheres	in	a	form	of	‘mock	impoliteness’,	
where	the	effects	in	discourse	of	a	manifestly	impolite	surface	form	are	
mismatched	with	the	interactive	context	(Culpeper,	2011:	208;	Leech,	1983:	142‐
5;	see	also	Bousfield,	2008;	Bousfield	and	Locher,	2008).	Of	course,	the	mismatch	
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in	discourse	needs	to	be	observed	and	ratified	so	that	the	status	of	an	otherwise	
insulting	utterance	can	be	interpreted	as	unserious.	This	situated	risk–taking	on	
the	part	of	the	speaker	explains	the	well	documented	social‐solidary	function	of	
banter,	where	the	pretend	insults	can	only	function	between	those	who	know	each	
other	well	or	in	a	discourse‐world	interaction	where	there	is	trust	and	a	sense	of	
in‐group	membership.		
There	is	no	doubt	that	banter	as	an	interactive	strategy	is	enshrined	in	the	
discourse	of	sport	and	the	well‐attested	badinage	that	embodies	communication	
between	both	fans	and	players	hardly	needs	academic	confirmation	(although	see	
Adetunji,	2013:	passim).	However,	key	factors	of	the	discourse‐world	context	in	
this	case	militate	against,	and	ultimately	invalidate,	this	interpretation.	The	LWMC	
ruling	clearly	directs	the	court	to	form	the	view	from	Terry’s	‘demeanour’	at	the	
time	of	utterance	that	he	was	undisputedly	‘angry’	(Riddle,	2012:	3‐4).	The	context	
of	an	angry	exchange	is	not	a	natural	predisposition	to	banter,	nor	is	the	inclusion	
in	the	utterance	of	an	explicit	allusion	to	race,	which,	within	the	parameters	of	
social	actor	analysis,	constitutes	‘identification’	(van	Leeuwen,	1996:	54).	In	terms	
of	the	taboo	or	‘out‐group’	implications	of	such	a	reference	to	colour	by	a	white	
speaker,	Billig	(2001:	269)	highlights	the	problems	of	social	acceptability	that	
relate	to	interaction	involving	references	to	race,	and	of	the	risk	of	the	negative	
ethnic	stereotypes	that	accrue	from	attempts	at	light‐hearted	humour.	
The	third	position,	that	the	words	can	be	construed	as	ironically	framed,	is	
more	promising	because	it	resonates	with	the	argumentation	developed	by	the	
legal	professionals	involved	in	both	hearings.	Moreover,	there	is	evidence	in	
linguistics	research	for	the	existence	of	clear	points	of	intersection	between	legal	
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rulings	and	the	assessments	by	judges	and	lawyers	of	certain	forms	of	language	
being	used	ironically	or	insincerely.	For	instance,	Little	(2009),	citing	a	tort	
involving	unwanted	‘banter’	from	a	company	foreman	to	another	employee,	shows	
how	a	speaker’s	claim	to	be	using	humour	or	irony	can	‘inoculate	allegedly	
harassing	communications	from	liability’	(Little,	2009:	1278‐9).	Similarly,	Simpson	
and	Mayr	(2009)	draw	attention	to	the	case	of	a	British	lawyer	who	was	dismissed	
from	her	job	for	using,	what	her	employment	tribunal	conceded,	was	a	piece	of	
manifestly	ironic	discourse	(Simpson	and	Mayr,	2009:	26‐7).	In	the	following	
section	we	offer	a	more	detailed	account	of	both	irony	and	its	potential	
repercussions	for	the	Terry	case.	
	
Irony	and	‘[you	/	ya]	fucking	black	cunt’	
This	is	not	the	place	to	undertake	a	detailed	review	of	the	huge	body	of	research	on	
the	pragmatics	of	irony.	Suffice	it	to	say,	irony	in	discourse	presents	and	manifests	
in	many	tropes,	modes	and	categories	and	can	be	approached	and	classified	with	a	
range	of	frameworks	of	analysis.	(See	the	overviews	in,	for	example,	Clark,	2013;	
Dynel,	forthcoming;	Simpson,	2011.)	For	the	purposes	of	the	present	analysis,	we	
draw	on	the	particular	framework	that	is	Sperber	and	Wilson’s	model	of	irony	as	
echoic	mention	(e.g.	Sperber	and	Wilson,	1981;	Wilson	and	Sperber,	1992).	This	
framework	is	built	on	the	logical	distinction	between	use	and	mention	such	that	a	
speaker	may	echo	ironically	another	speaker’s	discourse	by	mentioning	or	
repeating	their	utterance.	Consider	an	‘ironic’	exchange	such	as	the	following:	
A:	I’m	tired. 	
B:	You’re	tired!	And	what	do	you	think	I	am? 	
(after	Sperber	and	Wilson,	1981:	306,	original	emphasis)	
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Here,	the	proposition	A	is	tired	is	used	by	the	speaker	in	the	first	part	of	the	
exchange	but	is	explicitly	mentioned	in	B’s	response	in	the	second.	The	‘mention’	
version	indicates	that	the	previous	utterance	has	been	heard	and	understood,	and	
expresses	the	hearer’s	immediate	reaction	to	it.	As	Sperber	and	Wilson	cast	it,	the	
use‐mention	distinction	is	such	that	use	of	an	expression	involves	reference	to	
what	the	expression	refers	to,	while	mention	involves	reference	to	the	expression	
itself	(Sperber	and	Wilson,	1981:	303).	In	other	words,	an	utterance	is	echoic	if	it	is	
intended	to	be	understood	as	implicitly	attributing	a	thought	or	utterance	with	a	
similar	content	to	someone	else	(Clark,	2013:	281‐2).	The	echoed	form	also	
implicitly	conveys	the	speaker’s	attitude	to	that	thought	or	utterance.		
A	significant	theoretical	feature	of	the	Sperber	and	Wilson	model,	picked	up	
by	many	commentators,	is	their	stipulation	that	all	ironic	language	usage	is	
reducible	to	the	echoic	formula.	There	have	been	a	number	of	cogent	and	detailed	
critiques	of	this	rather	problematic	provision	in	the	echoic	mention	model	(see	for	
instance	Clark	and	Gerrig,	1984;	Giora	1997;	Kreuz	and	Glucksberg,	1989:	374‐6;	
Toolan,	1996:	184‐192;	Utsumi,	2000:	1780‐82).	The	position	taken	in	the	present	
article	is	that	there	are	qualitatively	distinct	forms	of	irony	of	which	the	echoic	
type	numbers	but	one.	That	said,	and	as	we	attempt	to	demonstrate	below,	the	
echoic	model	offers	significant	explanatory	potential	when	applied	to	the	
discourse	that	frames	the	R	v	John	Terry	episode.		
Although	the	term	irony	is	never	mentioned	explicitly,	a	key	question	in	the	
LWMC	verdict,	posed	early	on	by	magistrate	Riddle,	comes	very	close	to	capturing	
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the	essence	of	our	third	postulate	about	the	potential	speech	act	status	of	Terry’s	
utterance:	
The	question	for	me	is	whether	I	am	sure	that	the	words	were	used	as	an	
insult,	or	whether	it	is	possible,	as	the	defence	assert,	that	he	was,	or	
believed	he	was,	merely	repeating	an	allegation	made	to	him,	and	
dismissing	it.	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (Riddle,	2012:	3)	
	
In	all	but	name,	the	case	for	the	defence	is	embedded	in	a	framework	of	echoic	
irony.	That	is	to	say,	the	feature	of	Terry’s	utterance	with	the	potential	to	block	an	
interpretation	of	racism	is	the	possibility,	entertained	by	the	court,	that	he	is	
echoing	some	anterior	utterance	by	Anton	Ferdinand.	The	gist	of	what	Ferdinand	
was	alleged	to	have	said	to	Terry	on	the	pitch	was	an	accusation;	specifically,	that	
Terry	had	previously	called	him	a	black	cunt.	Terry’s	echo	of	this	accusation	
therefore	signals	not	concurrence	but	rejection:	Terry	‘mentions’	Ferdinand’s	
purported	accusation	only	to	communicate	his	distance	from	it.	In	keeping	with	
the	general	function	in	discourse	of	echoic	irony,	the	attitude	expressed	through	
the	attribution	of	an	utterance	to	another	speaker	is	normally	negative	(Clark,	
2013:	282).	In	other	words,	the	speaker	mentions	the	utterance	not	to	approve	or	
endorse	it,	but	to	disown	and	dismiss	it,	even	contemptuously	or	sarcastically	so.	
The	possibly	echoic	standing	of	Terry’s	words	was	deemed	enough	by	the	court	to	
render	at	least	inconclusive	the	intended	meaning	of	his	use	of	the	phrase	‘you	/	ya	
fucking	black	cunt’.	This	was	enough	for	the	LWMC	to	resolve	the	conundrum	that	
racist	words	were	not	used	in	a	racist	way.	Even	though	magistrate	Riddle	later	in	
the	ruling	considered	it	‘highly	unlikely’	that	Ferdinand	actually	made	this	
accusation	on	the	pitch,	he	ruled	that	it	was	possible	that	‘Mr	Terry	believed	at	the	
time,	and	believes	now,	that	such	an	accusation	was	made’	(Riddle,	2012:	14).	
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Accordingly,	it	was	therefore	possible	that	what	Terry	said	was	‘was	not	intended	
as	an	insult,	but	rather	as	a	challenge	to	what	he	believed	had	been	said	to	him’	
(Riddle,	2012:	14‐15).		
What	happened	in	and	through	discourse	to	the	LWMC	position	during	its	
transformation	into	the	language	of	the	FAJGT	investigation	receives	attention	
further	below.	However,	there	remain	certain	aspects	of	the	Terry‐Ferdinand	
exchange,	as	a	spoken	discourse‐world	encounter,	that	require	some	commentary	
here.	The	LWMC	ruling	makes	it	clear	that	lip‐reading	interpretations	were	not	
conclusive	and	that	aspects	of	body	language	were	not	accounted	for,	other	than	to	
consolidate	the	broad	assumption	that	Terry	was	angry.	This	legal	position	has	
implications	for	the	echoic	model	of	irony	employed	here.	The	Sperber	and	Wilson	
model	has	been	built	and	disseminated	largely	on	the	basis	of	invented,	context‐
less	examples.	Such	examples	invariably	fit	neatly	the	thrust	of	the	argument	
advanced	by	the	researchers	(a	perceived	weakness	in	the	model	which	has	been	
targeted	by	the	linguists	referenced	above).	The	world	of	real	discourse	is	
undoubtedly	more	messy,	indeterminate	and	open‐ended	than	the	tenets	of	the	
echoic	model	would	lead	us	to	believe.	However,	there	has	been	subsequent	
research	on	the	acoustic	qualities	of	aggressive	forms	of	irony	such	as	sarcasm	(e.g.	
Kreuz	and	Roberts,	1995;	see	also	Anolli	et	al,	2000;	Bryant	and	Fox	Tree,	2005).	
This	work	suggests	that	there	is	a	particular	articulatory	setting	and	tone	of	voice	
associated	with	the	physical	manifestation	of	this	strategy	as	discourse	and	
therefore,	by	imputation,	with	the	sort	of	ironic	delivery	ascribed	to	John	Terry’s	
utterance.	What	follows	are	some	observations	on	the	interrelationship	between	
the	vocal	features	of	spoken	sarcasm	with	the	interpretations	of	the	LWMC.	
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Caucci	et	al	(2014:	passim)	point	out	that	‘nonsarcastic’	utterances	are	
typically	louder	on	average	than	sarcastic	utterances.	They	add	that	the	
prototypical	make‐up	of	a	sarcastic	utterance	will	include	a	continuative	particle	
like	‘oh’	or	‘uh’	alongside	an	adverb‐adjective	pairing,	as	in	‘Uh,	yeah’	or	‘Oh,	that’s	
just	great!’.	Locating	sarcasm	specifically	in	the	echoic	mention	model,	Kreuz	and	
Glucksberg	characterise	sarcasm	as	an	especially	crude	form	of	verbal	irony	(1989:	
374).	In	a	nod	towards	Sperber	and	Wilson,	they	coin	the	expression	echoic	
reminder	theory	for	situations	when	a	speaker	alludes	to,	and	critiques,	some	
originating	state	of	affairs	(1989:	375).	Thus,	Terry’s	utterance,	to	be	construed	as	
sarcastic,	would	need	to	‘remind’	Ferdinand	of	his	assumed	antecedent	accusation	
and	in	doing	so	signal	Terry’s	sarcastic	disapproval	of	it.	Revealingly,	however,	
Kreuz	and	Glucksberg	establish	a	clear	direction	of	travel	in	their	assessment	of	
the	affective	dimensions	of	sarcastic	utterances:	only	a	positive	statement	can	
function	as	an	ironic	evaluation	of	a	negatively	perceived	person	or	event	(1989:	
376).	In	other	words,	Terry’s	utterance	would	be	much	more	readily	interpreted	as	
sarcasm	if	he	had	couched	it	in	the	sort	of	formula	described	by	Caucci	et	al	(2014)	
above;	that	is,	through	positively‐framed	syntactic	forms	such	as	‘nice	one	mate’	or	
‘yeah,	just	fuckin’	great’.	Moreover,	Rockwell’s	reading	of	the	vocal	cues	of	sarcasm	
(2000)	militates	further	against	any	credible	interpretation	(arising	from	linguistic	
analysis)	that	Terry	intended	his	words	to	be	ironic.	For	a	start,	Rockwell	
demonstrates	that	sarcasm	is	conveyed	by	a	voice	setting	that,	inter	alia,	shifts	to	a	
slower	tempo	and	to	a	lower	pitch	level	(2000:	483),	yet	even	a	rudimentary	
glance	at	the	footage	shows	that	Terry’s	vocal	delivery	is	anything	but	‘lower	and	
slower’.	Moreover,	Rockwell	offers	for	discussion	the	suggestion	that	sarcasm	is	
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invoked	in	situations	of	moderate	‘dislike’	where	it	is	used	to	indicate	negative	
emotion.	If	however,	the	dislike	is	greater,	then	this	‘might	be	expressed	in	a	form	
much	stronger	than	sarcasm,	such	a	direct	insult	or	an	expletive‐filled	outburst’	
(Rockwell,	2000:	492).	Paraphrasing	this	position,	sarcasm	therefore	gives	way	to	
pointed	abuse	in	verbal	encounters	which	are	epitomised	by	intense	dislike	or	
resentment,	abuse	which	might	very	well	inhere	in	an	expletive‐filled	utterance	
like	‘you	/	ya	fucking	black	cunt’.		
In	sum,	the	analysis	of	discourse	presented	here	does,	in	the	specific	context	
of	the	encounter,	tend	to	militate	against	the	interpretation	that	Terry	intended	his	
words	to	be	ironic.	However,	the	principal	focus	thus	far	has	been	on	Terry,	yet	he	
is	only	one	of	a	number	of	participants	who	play	different	discursive	roles	in	the	
event.	An	important	matter	is	the	part	Terry’s	assumed	antagonist,	Anton	
Ferdinand,	plays	in	the	construction	of	the	episode;	another	is	the	role	of	
teammate	Ashley	Cole	who	offers	corroborating	(but	as	will	be	observed	later,	far	
from	compelling)	evidence	in	the	aftermath	of	the	on‐pitch	confrontation.	
Moreover,	and	as	we	signalled	earlier,	an	important	question	concerns	the	
discursive	transformation	from	the	magistrate’s	position	into	that	of	the	FA	
investigation.	The	next	section	will	not	only	chart	this	discursive	transformation	
but,	drawing	on	a	further	set	of	analytic	models,	will	also	explore	the	cognitive	
positioning	of	the	other	participants	in	this	discursive	event.	
	
Mind‐modelling	as	a	strategy	for	discursive	reconciliation	
In	his	July	2012	ruling,	the	Chief	Magistrate	reports	that	he	has	received	a	
‘substantial	volume	of	unchallenged	evidence	from	witnesses’	(Riddle,	2012:	
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2)	to	confirm	that	Terry	is	not	a	racist	and	that	he	understands	why	Terry	
wishes	to	make	this	point,	his	reputation	being	at	stake.	However,	as	we	have	
already	noted,	he	is	careful	to	establish	from	the	outset	of	the	ruling	that	he	is	
concerned	only	with	assessing	the	intent	behind	Terry’s	discoursal	choices	
on	October	23rd	2011,	rather	than	with	an	evaluation	of	his	character	as	a	
whole.	With	this	in	mind,	it	is	interesting	to	observe	that	Riddle’s	
representation	of	the	evidence	which	was	put	before	him	over	the	course	of	
the	court	proceedings	does	in	fact	include	several	extensive	evaluations	of	
character.	However,	the	first	and	most	lengthy	of	these	evaluations	does	not	
focus	on	the	accused,	John	Terry,	but	on	Anton	Ferdinand.	The	extract	below,	
taken	from	Riddle’s	judgement,	concerns	the	evidence	provided	by	
Ferdinand,	evidence	within	which	the	Chief	Magistrate	has	just	outlined	a	
number	of	discrepancies.	He	goes	on	to	make	a	number	of	assessments,	not	
only	of	the	player’s	character,	but	also	of	the	possible	motivations	he	had	for	
certain	behaviours	and	choices,	as	follows:	
In	his	final	submissions	Mr	Penny	describes	Mr	Ferdinand	as	‘brave’	for	
giving	evidence.	I	think	this	is	a	reasonable	description.	I	am	satisfied	
that	he	would	have	preferred	not	to	be	involved	in	this	trial	at	all.	I	am	
satisfied	that	there	was	little	or	no	good	reason	for	him	to	lie	about	the	
central	issue	in	this	case.	Mr	Penny	provides	good	reasons	for	that	
conclusion.	While	there	are	indeed	discrepancies	in	his	evidence	I	think	
it	is	unlikely	that	on	the	central	point	he	is	lying.	I	have	no	significant	
doubts	about	his	integrity.	There	are	doubts	about	what	he	said	at	the	
time	of	the	second	fist	pumping	gesture.	He	may	easily	have	
misremembered.	I	also	have	a	doubt	when	he	says	he	was	unaware	of	
the	crucial	comment	made	to	him	by	John	Terry.	They	were	directed	at	
him.	He	had	had	eye	contact	with	Mr	Terry	and	may	well	have	been	
looking	for	a	reaction	from	him.	I	accept	his	evidence	about	this	may	
well	be	true,	as	he	turned	his	attention	back	to	the	game.	However,	I	
cannot	discount	the	possibility	that	he	was	aware	of	the	comments	
directed	at	him,	and	found	it	easier	to	say	that	he	wasn’t.	If	that	is	the	
case	it	would	be	wrong	of	him,	but	understandable.	To	make	it	clear,	I	
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am	not	saying	he	was	aware,	just	that	he	may	have	been,	despite	his	
evidence	to	the	contrary.	
(Riddle,	2012:	6)	
There	are	a	number	of	particularly	noteworthy	components	within	this	paragraph.	
First	of	all,	Riddle	reports	that	Penny	has	described	Ferdinand	as	‘brave’	and	adds	
that	he	finds	this	a	‘reasonable	description’.	He	then	goes	on	to	make	a	series	of	
speculations	about	Ferdinand’s	state	of	mind	both	during	the	incident	on	October	
23rd	and	during	the	court	case,	commenting	for	example	that	‘[Ferdinand]	would	
have	preferred	not	to	be	involved	in	this	trial	at	all’,	‘[Ferdinand]	may	have	been	
looking	for	a	reaction’,	and	that	he	cannot	‘discount	the	possibility	that	[Ferdinand]	
was	aware	of	the	comments	directed	at	him,	and	found	it	easier	to	say	that	he	
wasn’t’.	Each	of	these	speculations	involves	some	degree	of	what	has	elsewhere	
been	termed	‘mind‐modelling’	(see	Stockwell,	2009).		
	 The	concept	of	mind‐modelling	has	been	put	forward	within	the	discipline	
of	cognitive	poetics	to	refer	to	the	common	ability	of	readers	of	literary	texts	to	
formulate	cognitive	models	of	characters’	thoughts,	motivations,	perspectives	and	
belief‐systems	on	the	basis	of	textual	and	contextual	information.	Although	
intended	to	account	specifically	for	readers’	experiences	of	literary	text‐worlds,	the	
notion	of	literary	mind‐modelling	itself	is	a	development	of	cognitive‐psychological	
accounts	of	real‐world	behaviours.	It	builds	upon	the	concept	of	‘Theory	of	Mind’	
(ToM):	the	capacity	to	understand	that	other	human	beings	have	a	mind	which	
operates	similarly	to	one’s	own	and	to	impute	different	beliefs	about	the	world	to	
others	(see	Belmonte,	2008).	ToM	was	initially	and	most	prominently	adapted	for	
literary	theory	by	Zunshine	(2003,	2006).	However,	Belmonte	(2008:	192)	notes	
that	Zunshine’s	reinterpretation	of	the	concept	to	refer	to	a	temporally	extended,	
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offline	process	applied	during	reading	departs	significantly	from	the	original	
psychological	use	of	the	term	to	explain	an	online,	real‐time	process	applied	during	
the	act	of	interpreting	human	behaviour.	Stockwell’s	(2009)	use	of	a	completely	
different	term,	‘mind‐modelling’,	is	thus	a	deliberate	attempt	to	distinguish	
between	these	two	processes,	with	mind‐modelling	encompassing	more	than	an	
online	evaluation	of	the	behaviour	of	others	and	including	non‐belief	domains	such	
as	the	imagined	desires,	wishes,	and	physical	needs	of	others,	as	well	as	
consideration	of	the	respective	feelings	of	characters	towards	each	other,	often	
filtered	through	narration	or	authorial	voice	(Stockwell,	2009:	140).	
	 This	broader	conception	of	our	ability	to	model	the	mental	processes	of	
others	has	obvious	value	in	understanding	Riddle’s	necessary	recourse	to	
character	construction	and	assessment	in	his	judgement	on	the	case	of	R	v		John	
Terry.	As	in	all	legal	proceedings,	the	Chief	Magistrate,	having	not	been	present	in	
the	immediate	environment	of	the	discourse	event	in	focus,	must	base	his	decision‐
making	on	a	range	of	textual	submissions	made	by	a	variety	of	narrators	at	other	
spatio‐temporal	points	in	the	process.	This	narrativisation	of	the	event	under	
consideration	through	an	assortment	of	different	perspectives,	although	based	on	
real‐world	occurrences,	bears	ontological	similarities	with	literary	fiction.	The	
cognitive	discourse	framework	of	Text	World	Theory	(see	Gavins,	2007;	Werth	
1999	for	comprehensive	accounts)	offers	a	helpful	means	of	understanding	this	
ontological	structure	and	its	implications	for	the	processing	of	the	discourse	as	a	
whole.		
	 Text	World	Theory	provides	a	unified	analytical	framework	through	which	
the	textual	and	conceptual	structures	of	discourse	can	be	examined	within	the	
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context	of	their	production	and	reception.	At	various	points	so	far	in	this	article,	
we	have	already	referred	to	the	immediate	situation	surrounding	Terry	and	
Ferdinand	during	their	encounter	at	Loftus	Road	as	a	‘discourse‐world’	(see	
Gavins,	2007:	18‐34),	a	Text	World	Theory	term	which	recognises	that	the	
discourse	itself	will	be	governed	not	only	by	elements	of	the	physical	setting	(e.g.	a	
football	pitch,	the	football	players,	a	referee	and	crowd	during	a	major	league	
game),	but	also	by	the	personal	and	cultural	baggage	each	participant	in	the	
discourse	brings	with	them	to	the	event	(e.g.	their	knowledge,	their	beliefs,	their	
perceptions	and	opinions).	As	we	have	already	seen,	the	recreation	of	this	
discourse‐world	in	its	full	detail	and	complexity	is	practically	impossible	post‐hoc	
and	it	is	precisely	the	unique	and	subjective	experience	of	the	discourse	by	the	
participants	which	lies	at	the	heart	of	the	R	v	John	Terry	case.	Furthermore,	as	
Terry	and	Ferdinand	communicated	within	their	discourse‐world	environment,	
they	both	produced	‘text‐worlds’:	mental	representations	of	the	discourse	created	
not	only	from	the	language	they	encountered,	but	influenced	by	their	individual	
backgrounds	and	beliefs	(see	Gavins,	2007:	35‐72).	Both	the	original	discourse‐
world	and	its	consequent	text‐worlds	are	inaccessible	to	Howard	Riddle	except	
through	the	textual,	narrativised	representations	made	of	the	event	by	participants	
within	a	separate	discourse‐world,	that	of	the	LWMC	court	case,	taking	place	at	a	
later	time	and	in	a	different	location.	This	discourse‐world	is	governed	by	a	
separate	set	of	contextual	factors	and	influences,	despite	being	populated	by	some	
of	the	same	discourse	participants:	it	includes,	for	example,	John	Terry,	Anton	
Ferdinand	and	Ashley	Cole,	but	not	the	entire	Loftus	Road	stadium	crowd;	these	
participants	have	very	different	expectations	and	motivations	within	the	
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environment	of	Westminster	Magistrates’	Court	than	they	would	have	on	a	football	
pitch.	Thus,	the	only	way	the	magistrate	can	possibly	reach	a	judgement	on	the	
intentions	behind	John	Terry’s	uncontested	use	of	the	words	‘fucking	black	cunt’	
on	October	23rd	2011	is	through	the	same	sort	of	textually‐based	modelling	of	the	
minds	involved	in	the	incident	as	the	reader	of	a	literary	narrative	would	
undertake,	albeit	within	a	very	different	interpretative	frame.	
	 The	only	potentially	surprising	element	to	this	is	the	markedly	different	use	
of	mind‐modelling	which	Riddle	employs	in	his	discussion	of	the	evidence	put	
forward	by	Terry	compared	with	that	which	he	employs	when	assessing	
Ferdinand.	Riddle	does	engage	in	the	conceptual	modelling	of	Terry	at	several	
points	in	his	judgement.	However,	the	suppositions	he	makes	about	the	player’s	
mental	activity	are	comparatively	brief	and	tend	to	focus	solely	on	Terry’s	online	
perceptions	during	the	match.	For	instance,	in	a	paragraph	reflecting	on	evidence	
from	Terry	that	he	suffered	repeated	taunts	from	other	players	over	his	affair	with	
a	team‐mate’s	wife,	Riddle	comments:	‘They	did	not	anger	him’	(Riddle,	2012:	8);	
later	in	the	judgement,	he	supposes	that	‘Mr	Terry	will	have	known’	that	there	
would	be	recordings	of	his	encounters	with	Ferdinand	(Riddle,	2012:	11);	he	goes	
to	say	that	‘Mr	Terry	wanted	to	see	and	speak	to	Mr	Ferdinand’	(Riddle,	2012:12)	
after	the	match,	and	so	on.	Each	of	these	instances	of	mind‐modelling	is	limited	to	a	
hypothesis	of	Terry’s	state	of	mind	at	specific	points	during	and	immediately	after	
the	match.	By	contrast,	in	his	much	more	extensive	commentary	on	Ferdinand	in	
the	extract	quoted	above,	Riddle	appears	to	be	more	concerned	with	constructing	a	
picture	of	this	player’s	enduring	character	traits,	as	he	concurs	that	he	is	‘brave’	
and	goes	on	to	say	that	he	has	‘no	significant	doubts	about	his	integrity’.	The	
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temporal	boundaries	around	Riddle’s	mind‐modelling	of	Ferdinand	are	much	
wider	than	those	he	establishes	around	Terry	and	encompass	Ferdinand’s	
motivations	and	reactions	before,	during,	and	after	the	match,	through	the	run‐up	
to	the	court	case,	and	throughout	the	legal	proceedings.	Observations	such	as	‘I	am	
satisfied	that	he	would	have	preferred	not	to	be	involved	in	this	trial	at	all’	and	‘I	
cannot	discount	the	possibility	that	he	was	aware	of	the	comments	directed	at	him,	
and	found	it	easier	to	say	that	he	wasn’t’,	point	to	Riddle’s	broader	modelling	of	
Ferdinand’s	reliability	as	a	witness	and	a	wider‐reaching	assessment	of	his	overall	
honesty.		
	 In	this	way,	Riddle	can	be	seen	to	be	distinguishing	conceptually	and	
linguistically	between	the	contrasting	participant	roles	he	regards	Ferdinand	and	
Terry	as	inhabiting	in	the	discourse‐world	of	the	court	case.	As	defendant	in	the	
case,	Terry’s	behaviour	must	be	assessed	within	the	spatio‐temporal	parameters	
defined	by	the	alleged	offence:	a	racial	slur	issued	toward	a	black	player	during	a	
football	match.	As	Riddle	states	from	the	outset	of	his	judgement,	his	key	concern	
with	Terry	is	not	whether	he	is	racist,	in	any	temporally	continuous	sense,	but	
whether	he	acted	with	racist	intent	on	a	particular	occasion.	Arguably,	Ferdinand	
occupies	an	even	more	complex	position	in	the	environment	of	the	court,	being	
both	the	victim	of	and	a	key	witness	to	the	alleged	act	of	racist	abuse.	As	a	
consequence,	Riddle’s	consideration	of	Ferdinand’s	evidence	must	necessarily	
involve	a	reconciliation	of	these	two	potentially	conflicting	discoursal	roles.	This	
he	achieves	through	a	modelling	of	the	player’s	mind	both	within	the	spatio‐
temporal	boundaries	of	the	alleged	offence	and	beyond	this,	as	the	temporally	
extended	phenomenon	of	perceived	character.	In	other	words,	for	the	purposes	of	
	 21
the	legal	judgement,	Ferdinand	is	granted	a	conceptual	life	beyond	the	alleged	
offence,	where	Terry,	in	effect,	is	not.	
	
Modalised	subjectivity	and	the	burden	and	standard	of	proof	
It	is	further	interesting	to	note	the	heavily	modalised	language	that	Riddle	uses	to	
frame	his	mind‐modelling	of	both	Terry	and	Ferdinand,	as	well	as	his	final	verdict	
on	the	case	as	a	whole.	An	explication	of	the	full	range	of	modal	expressions	in	
English	and	the	varied	approaches	to	their	classification	in	linguistics	is	beyond	the	
scope	of	this	article	(for	a	selection,	see	Coates,	1983;	Halliday	and	Matthiesson,	
2013:	176‐93;	Nuyts,	2001;	Palmer,	2001;	Perkins,	1983;	Portner,	2009).	However,	
in	the	243‐word	extract	examined	above,	Riddle	uses	modalisation	of	one	form	or	
another	a	total	of	21	times.	As	one	might	expect	in	an	extended	statement	of	
subjective	judgement	and	belief,	epistemic	modality	is	particularly	prominent	in	
these	lines.	Epistemic	modality	is	usefully	defined	by	Nuyts	(2001:	21)	as	the	
linguistic	expression	of	‘an	evaluation	of	the	chances	that	a	certain	hypothetical	
state	of	affairs	under	consideration…	will	occur,	is	occurring,	or	has	occurred	in	a	
possible	world	which	serves	as	the	universe	of	interpretation	for	the	evaluation	
process’.	Riddle	states,	for	instance,	‘I	think	this	is	a	reasonable	description’,	‘it	is	
unlikely	on	the	central	point	that	he	is	lying’,	‘I	cannot	discount	the	possibility	that	
he	was	aware’	(our	emphasis),	and	so	on,	as	he	summarises	some	of	the	evidence	
presented	to	him	over	the	course	of	the	proceedings	and	expresses	the	degree	of	
confidence	he	has	in	it.	However,	the	mind‐modelling	component	of	the	passage	
also	leads	Riddle	to	embed	the	attitudes	of	others	within	the	modalised	discourse	
through	which	he	expresses	his	own	subjectivity.	For	example,	he	uses	a	boulomaic	
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modal	lexical	verb	in	his	modelling	of	Ferdinand’s	wishes	(‘he	would	have	
preferred	not	to	be	involved	in	this	trial	at	all’	[our	emphasis]).	Often	overlooked	in	
a	good	deal	of	early	research	on	modality,	boulomaic	modality	is	best	understood	
as	the	means	through	which	a	speaker’s	relative	like	or	dislike	of	a	particular	state	
of	affairs	is	expressed	(see,	for	example,	Lyons,	1977;	Nuyts,	2006;	Perkins,	1983;	
Simpson,	1993;	see	also	Giovanelli,	2013	for	an	extensive	treatment	from	a	
specifically	Text	World	Theory	perspective).	It	is	employed	by	Riddle	here	to	
demonstrate	his	own	interpretation	of	Ferdinand’s	attitude	to	his	participation	in	
the	hearing,	alongside	which	Riddle	also	makes	further	use	of	epistemic	modality	
in	his	speculations	on	Ferdinand’s	knowledge	(e.g.	‘He	may	easily	have	
misremembered’,	‘he	says	he	was	unaware’,	‘he	was	aware	of	the	comments	directed	
at	him,	and	found	it	easier	to	say	he	wasn’t’	[our	emphasis]).	
	 The	density	of	modal	operators	at	work	in	Riddle’s	discourse	becomes	of	
crucial	importance	in	his	closing	paragraphs,	in	which	he	states	his	final	judgement	
on	the	case:	
Weighing	all	the	evidence	together,	I	think	it	is	highly	unlikely	that	Mr	
Ferdinand	accused	Mr	Terry	on	the	pitch	of	calling	him	a	black	cunt.	
However	I	accept	that	it	is	possible	that	Mr	Terry	believed	at	the	time,	
and	believes	now,	that	such	an	accusation	was	made.	The	prosecution	
evidence	as	to	what	was	said	by	Mr	Ferdinand	at	this	point	is	not	
strong.	Mr	Cole	gives	corroborating	(although	far	from	compelling	
corroborating)	evidence	on	this	point.	It	is	therefore	possible	that	what	
he	said	was	not	intended	as	an	insult,	but	rather	as	a	challenge	to	what	
he	believed	had	been	said	to	him.	
	(Riddle,	2012:	14‐15)	
	
The	epistemic	modality	present	in	this	paragraph	expresses	a	relatively	weak	
commitment	of	belief	to	a	number	of	propositions,	including	that	‘Mr	Ferdinand	
accused	Mr	Terry	on	the	pitch	of	calling	him	a	black	cunt’,	that	‘Mr	Terry	believed…	
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that	such	an	accusation	was	made’	(which	itself	contains	an	embedded	epistemic	
modal,	modelling	Terry’s	beliefs),	and	‘that	what	he	said	was	not	intended	as	an	
insult’	(again,	containing	embedded	deontic	modality).	In	each	case,	Riddle	chooses	
a	modalised	form	over	an	alternative,	non‐modalised	categorical	assertion,	
consequently	allowing	for	an	element	of	doubt	in	his	evaluation.	In	cognitive	terms,	
he	positions	the	modalised	proposition	at	a	greater	epistemic	distance	from	his	
own	discourse‐world	than	that	which	an	unmodalised	proposition	would	occupy.	
Text	World	Theory	views	all	modality	as	world‐forming	and	argues	that	linguistic	
instances	such	as	those	outlined	above	require	a	new	mental	representation,	a	
‘modal‐world’	(see	Gavins,	2007:	91‐125),	to	be	created	in	the	mind	of	the	hearer	
or	reader	through	which	the	remote	nature	of	the	proposition	can	be	
conceptualised	and	understood.	Figure	2	illustrates,	through	Text	World	Theory	
notation,	how	such	epistemic	distance	is	constructed	in	Riddle’s	discourse	at	this	
point.		
To	the	far	left	of	the	diagram	can	be	seen	the	text‐world	of	Riddle’s	
judgement,	in	which	he	positions	himself,	weighing	up	the	evidence	which	has	
been	brought	before	him	over	the	course	of	the	case	and	expressing	his	opinion	on	
it.	From	within	this,	he	expresses	relatively	weak	epistemic	commitment	to	three	
separate	propositions,	by	using	two	epistemic	modal	lexical	verbs,	‘I	think’	and	‘I	
accept’,	and	the	modalised	adjectival	construction,	‘It	is	therefore	possible	that’.	
These	can	be	seen	emerging	from	the	matrix	text‐world	as	epistemic	(‘EPS’)	
modal‐worlds.	In	each	case,	a	remote	conceptual	space	is	created	through	which	
the	epistemic	distance	of	the	proposition	concerned	can	be	expressed	and	
understood.	However,	in	each	case	this	conceptual	distance	is	not	easily	resolved,	
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as	in	each	case	a	further	instance	of	modal	embedding	occurs.	For	example,	at	the	
top	of	the	diagram	is	shown	the	initial	epistemic	modal‐world	which	is	created	
when	Riddle	states	‘I	think’	in	the	first	line	of	the	extract.	Riddle	then	modalises	
what	he	thinks	with	a	further	epistemic	adjectival	construction,	‘it	is	highly	
unlikely	that’.	This	adds	another	layer	of	uncertainty	to	the	core	proposition	that	
‘Mr	Ferdinand	accused	Mr	Terry	on	the	pitch	of	calling	him	a	black	cunt’,	which	has	
already	been	positioned	remotely	from	Riddle	in	the	matrix	text‐world	as	a	
product	of	his	thinking,	rather	than	a	categorical	assertion.		
	
INSERT	FIGURE	2	AS	CLOSE	TO	HERE	AS	POSSIBLE	
	
	 A	similar	pattern	of	embedded	modality	occurs	when	Riddle	makes	the	
statement	already	touched	upon	earlier	in	this	article	as	playing	a	crucial	role	in	
the	possible	interpretation	of	Terry’s	words	as	echoic	irony:	‘I	accept	that	it	is	
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possible	that	Mr	Terry	believed	at	the	time,	and	believes	now,	that	such	an	
accusation	was	made’.	Figure	2	now	provides	added	detail	of	the	conceptual	
structure	relating	to	this	statement,	shown	in	the	middle	of	the	diagram.	Once	
more,	Riddle	follows	an	initial	epistemic	modal	lexical	verb,	‘I	accept’,	with	further	
modalisation,	‘it	is	possible	that’,	again	creating	one	modal‐world	embedded	within	
another.	In	this	case,	however,	the	embedding	reaches	a	further	remote	point,	as	
Riddle	models	Terry’s	state	of	mind	at	two	separate	temporal	points:	‘Mr	Terry	
believed	at	the	time,	and	believes	now’.	The	modal‐worlds	which	result	are	shown	
to	the	far	right	of	Figure	2,	the	first	bearing	a	temporal	signature	of	October	2011,	
signalled	by	the	simple	past	tense	used,	and	the	second	relating	to	July	2012,	
signalled	by	Riddle’s	shift	to	the	simple	present.	This,	it	could	be	argued,	is	the	only	
point	at	which	the	Chief	Magistrate	appears	to	establish	a	temporal	continuity	in	
Terry’s	character.	However,	he	articulates	this	not	as	a	continuous	process	(as,	for	
example,	might	be	achieved	in	a	construction	such	as	‘Mr	Terry	has	always	
believed…’),	but	by	presenting	two	isolated	temporal	moments	in	distinct	modal‐
worlds.		
	 Finally,	Riddle	attempts	to	mind‐model	Terry	a	further	time,	by	stating	that	
it	is	‘possible	that	what	he	said	was	not	intended	as	an	insult,	but	rather	as	a	
challenge	to	what	he	believed	had	been	said	to	him’.	The	consequent	modal‐worlds	
are	shown	at	the	bottom	of	Figure	2.	Here,	Riddle	begins	by	embedding	Terry’s	
beliefs	and	intentions	at	the	time	he	said	the	words	‘fucking	black	cunt’	within	an	
epistemic	modal‐world	which	couches	this	mind‐modelling	as	a	possible	
interpretation	only.	He	then	creates	a	further	two	modal‐worlds,	the	first	of	which	
(‘what	he	said	was	not	intended	as	an	insult’)	is	boulomaic	in	nature	and	also,	
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crucially,	negated	(signalled	in	Text	World	Theory	notation	through	the	use	of	a	
dotted	line).	In	line	with	other	cognitive‐linguistic	theories,	negation	is	regarded	
from	a	text‐world	perspective	as	having	a	fundamentally	foregrounding	effect	in	
discourse,	since	negated	propositions	must	first	be	conceptualised	as	positive	
manifestations	in	order	then	to	be	‘unconceptualised’	(see	Hidalgo	Downing,	
2000a	for	a	full	explication;	see	also	Gavins,	2007	and	2013;	Gavins	and	Stockwell,	
2012;	Hidalgo	Downing,	2000b;	Lakoff,	2004;	and	Nahajec,	2009).	Thus,	in	Riddle’s	
final	assessment	of	the	intentions	behind	Terry’s	use	of	the	words	‘fucking	black	
cunt’,	the	assessment	on	which	the	entire	court	case	hinges,	the	Chief	Magistrate	
first	positions	Terry’s	defence	as	a	possibility	relatively	remote	from	the	text‐
world;	he	then	chooses	a	syntactic	structure	which	leads	the	positive	proposition	
that	Terry	did	intend	the	words	as	an	insult	to	be	conceptualised	before	its	
negative	value	can	be	understood.	Furthermore,	Riddle	co‐locates	this	negated	
modal‐world	with	the	epistemic	modal‐world	containing	Terry’s	belief	about	what	
had	been	said	to	him,	provided	as	a	motivation	for	his	behaviour	and	also	
expressed	as	a	possibility.	
	 It	is	important	to	note	at	this	point	that	the	burden	of	proof	in	criminal	
proceedings	in	the	United	Kingdom	typically	lies	with	the	prosecution,	who	must	
prove	the	case	against	a	defendant	beyond	all	reasonable	doubt,	the	standard	of	
proof	in	such	trials.	What	Riddle’s	use	of	modality	in	his	final	judgement	outlines	
are	the	points	at	which	reasonable	doubt	remains	in	the	prosecution’s	case	against	
Terry.	The	possibility	Riddle	identifies,	that	Terry	did	not	intend	to	use	the	words	
‘fucking	black	cunt’	towards	Ferdinand	as	an	insult,	however	remotely	this	may	be	
positioned	in	the	overall	conceptual	structure	of	his	discourse,	necessarily	means	
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that	the	Chief	Magistrate	must	find	the	defendant	not	guilty	of	the	charges	brought	
against	him.	Specifically,	on	the	basis	of	the	criminal	burden	and	standard	of	proof,	
Riddle	finds	that	Terry	is	not	guilty	of	using		
	 threatening,	abusive	or	insulting	words	or	behaviour	or	disorderly	
	 behaviour	within	the	hearing	or	sight	of	a	person	likely	to	be	caused	
	 harassment,	alarm	or	distress	and	the	offence	was	racially	aggravated	in	
	 accordance	with	section	28	of	the	Crime	and	Disorder	Act	1998.	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (Riddle,	2012:	1).		
Even	though	Riddle	states	that	he	finds	it	‘highly	unlikely	that	Mr	Ferdinand	
accused	Mr	Terry	on	the	pitch	of	calling	him	a	black	cunt’,	this	epistemic	modal‐
world	exists	on	the	same	ontological	level	as	that	constructed	by	the	defence’s	
account	of	Terry’s	intentions	and	motivations	and	does	not,	therefore,	negate	this	
explanation	of	events	as	equally	possible	in	Riddle’s	view.	
	 In	civil	legal	proceedings	in	the	United	Kingdom	the	burden	and	standard	of	
proof	differ	from	those	in	criminal	cases.	As	we	have	noted	several	times	already,	
following	the	resolution	of	Terry’s	criminal	trial,	and	specifically	following	his	
admission	that	he	used	the	words	‘fucking	black	cunt’	during	the	Loftus	Road	
match,	the	Regulatory	Commission	of	the	Football	Association	held	its	own	
disciplinary	hearing	on	the	incident	in	September	2012	(FAJGT,	2012).	The	
commission	charged	Terry	with	‘Misconduct	pursuant	to	Rule	E.3(1)	of	its	Rules	
and	Regulations,	which	included	a	reference	to	the	ethnic	origin	and/or	colour	
and/or	race	of	Mr.	Ferdinand	within	the	meaning	of	Rule	E.3(2)’	(FAJGT,	2012:	6).	
The	commission	goes	on	to	define	the	burden	and	standard	of	proof	to	which	their	
hearing	accords	within	their	ruling	on	the	case,	as	follows:	
The	burden	of	proving	the	charge	rests	with	the	FA…	The	applicable	
standard	of	proof	shall	be	the	flexible	civil	standard	of	the	balance	of	
probability.	The	more	serious	the	allegation,	taking	into	account	the	
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nature	of	the	Misconduct	alleged	and	the	context	of	the	case,	the	greater	
the	burden	of	evidence	required	to	prove	the	matter.	
(FAJGT,	2012:	9)	
The	shift	here	from	the	standard	of	reasonable	doubt	applied	by	Riddle	in	the	
criminal	trial	to	a	lower	standard	of	the	balance	or	preponderance	of	probability	
had	significant	consequences	for	Terry.	Most	interestingly,	Riddle’s	use	of	modality	
in	the	earlier	legal	proceedings	comes	under	extended,	close	scrutiny	in	the	FA’s	
ruling	as	they	note,	in	particular,	that	‘Mr.	Terry’s	credibility	in	the	eyes	of	the	Chief	
Magistrate	appears	to	have	had	its	limitations’	(FAJGT,	2012:	31).		
	 Over	three	pages	in	their	judgement	on	the	matter,	the	FA	outline	the	ways	
in	which	they	believe	Riddle’s	lack	of	confidence	in	Terry’s	credibility	can	be	‘found	
in	the	way	the	Chief	Magistrate	expressed	[his]	findings’	(FAJGT,	2012:	25).	Each	of	
the	examples	of	Riddle’s	language	they	go	on	to	cite	is	a	form	of	modalisation,	as	
the	FA	quote	the	magistrate’s	repeated	use	of	‘highly	unlikely’,	‘inherently	
unlikely’,	and	‘possible’,	concluding	that		
it	is	tolerably	clear	from	the	precise	and	careful	language	in	which	he	
couched	the	above	findings	that	the	Chief	Magistrate	would	not	have	
been	satisfied,	on	a	balance	of	probabilities,	the	Mr.	Ferdinand	did	
accuse	Mr.	Terry	on	the	pitch	of	calling	him	a	‘black	cunt’.	In	particular,	
his	use	of	the	words	‘inherently	unlikely’	in	that	context	would	obviously	
be	inconsistent	with	a	finding	to	the	civil	standard	of	proof	that	Mr.	
Ferdinand	did	use	the	words	‘black	cunt’	first.	
(FAJGT,	2012:	27)	
	
Indeed,	the	FA	do	not	stop	at	a	simple	identification	of	the	epistemic	distance	at	
which	Riddle	positions	various	propositions	and	an	interpretation	of	his	
consequent	ruling.	Their	own	judgement	on	the	incident	between	Terry	and	
Ferdinand	includes	a	point‐by‐point	commentary	on	several	of	Riddle’s	
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assessments,	alongside	a	series	of	categorical	assertions	of	the	FA’s	contrasting	
evaluation	of	the	evidence.	The	FA	concludes	the	following	points:	
(i)	 That	Mr.	Ferdinand	did	not	accuse	Mr.	Terry	of	racially	abusing	
him	and	did	not	use	the	word	‘black’	or	any	words	that	could	have	
been	heard,	understood,	or	misunderstood	by	anyone	to	have	any	
kind	of	reference	to,	or	context	with,	skin	colour,	race	or	ethnicity.	
We	are	driven	to	conclude	not	just	that	it	is	‘highly	unlikely’	that	
Mr.	Ferdinand	accused	Mr.	Terry	on	the	pitch	of	calling	him	a	
‘black	cunt’,	but	that	he	did	not.		
	
(ii)	 That	Mr.	Terry	did	not	hear,	and	could	not	have	believed,	
understood	or	misunderstood	Mr.	Ferdinand	to	have	used	the	
word	‘black’,	or	any	word(s)	that	might	have	suggested	that	he	
was	accusing	Mr.	Terry	of	racially	abusing	him.		
	
(iii)	 That	Mr.	Cole	did	not	hear,	and	could	not	have	believed,	
understood	or	misunderstood	Mr.	Ferdinand	to	have	used	the	
word	‘black’	or	any	other	word	beginning	with	the	word	‘B’	that	
had	any	reference	to,	or	context	with,	skin	colour,	race	or	ethnicity	
[...]		
	
(iv)	 That	in	the	brief	time	that	it	took	Mr.	Ferdinand	to	advance	up	the	
pitch	towards	Mr.	Terry,	it	is	improbable	that	the	focus	of	Mr.	
Ferdinand’s	abuse	and	insults	of	Mr.	Terry	would	have	changed	so	
quickly	from	an	allegation	of	an	affair,	to	one		involving	skin	
colour,	or	race.		
	
(v)		 Apart	from	the	initial	phase	of	the	incident	as	a	whole,	Mr.	Terry	
and	Mr.	Ferdinand	were	never	closer	to	one	another	than	an	
estimated	distance	of	19	metres.	In	interview,	Mr.	Terry	estimated	
the	distance	between	them	to	be	between	20	and	35	yards	during	
the	crucial	phase	of	their	exchange.	Loftus	Road	is	a	small,	
compact	ground.	The	crowd	is	close	to	the	pitch.	Witnesses	
comment	on	the	noise	that	is	generated,	including	Mr.	Terry	
himself.	Accordingly,	when	he	turned	to	face	the	play,	and	prepare	
for	the	free	kick,	Mr.	Terry	would	have	seen	the	pumping	fist	
gesture	of	Mr.	Ferdinand,	but	it	is	unlikely	that	he	would	have	
heard	anything	that	the	latter	may	have	been	saying.	
(FAJGT,	2012:	32‐33)	
	
In	contrast	with	Riddle’s	language,	the	majority	of	this	discourse	is	unmodalised.	
Rather	than	positioning	their	view	on	the	Terry/Ferdinand	incident	within	remote	
modal‐worlds	of	possibility	and	likelihood,	the	FA	construct	representations	of	the	
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event	mainly	at	the	text‐world	level.	The	ruling	does,	however,	include	three	key	
epistemic	modals:	‘Mr.	Ferdinand…	did	not	use	the	word	‘black’	or	any	words	that	
could	have	been	heard,	understood,	or	misunderstood’;	‘Mr.	Terry	did	not	hear,	
and	could	not	have	believed,	understood	or	misunderstood	Mr.	Ferdinand	to	have	
used	the	word	‘black’’;	and	‘Mr.	Cole	did	not	hear,	and	could	not	have	believed,	
understood	or	misunderstood	Mr.	Ferdinand	to	have	used	the	word	‘black’’.	
Alongside	the	effect	of	the	syntactic	parallelism	itself	here,	the	epistemic	operator	
‘could’	is	used	in	conjunction	with	negation	in	each	instance,	compounding	the	
foregrounded	nature	of	these	statements,	as	outlined	earlier	in	this	article.	
Negation	is	repeated	throughout	the	summary,	in	fact,	each	time	with	the	same	
foregrounding	effect:	‘Mr.	Ferdinand	did	not’,	‘he	did	not’,	‘Mr.	Terry	did	not’,	‘Mr.	
Cole	did	not’,	and	so	on.	Only	two	other	epistemic	modals	are	used	in	this	passage,	
when	the	FA	states	that	it	is	‘improbable’	that	any	insults	from	Ferdinand	would	
have	switched	topics	and	that	it	is	‘unlikely’	that	Terry	would	have	heard	
Ferdinand	anyway	from	his	position	on	the	pitch.	In	each	of	these	cases,	which	are	
not	accompanied	by	or	embedded	within	negated	syntactic	structures,	the	
modalisation	is	used	to	support	a	balance	of	probability	that	Terry’s	intention	was	
to	insult	Ferdinand	and	that	this	abuse	was	racially	aggravated.	It	is	through	this	
discursive	construction	of	the	event	that	the	FA’s	guilty	verdict	on	Terry	becomes	
an	inevitability,	just	as	Riddle’s	contrary	verdict	on	the	same	case	was	itself	
inevitable	within	its	own	legal	framework	and	discursive	system.	What	is	
highlighted	by	the	comparison	of	the	linguistic	strategies	employed	by	the	
participants	in	each	situation	and	the	consequent	conceptual	structures	created	in	
the	separate	LWMC	and	FAJGT	hearings	is	not	so	much	their	inconsistency	as	
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opposing	judgements,	but	their	inexorableness	given	competing	and	irreconcilable	
standards	and	burdens	of	proof.	
	
Concluding	Remarks	
Over	the	course	of	this	article,	the	linguistic,	pragmatic	and	cognitive	strategies	
that	structure	R	v	John	Terry	–	from	the	initial	verbal	encounter	on	the	football	field	
to	its	legal	repercussions	across	two	investigations	–	have	been	explored	using	a	
range	of	theoretical	models.	Our	analytic	toolkit	has	of	necessity	been	both	catholic	
and	eclectic	in	order	to	probe	initially	the	micro‐dynamics	of	the	exchange	that	
activated	the	event	and	subsequently	to	position	this	exchange	in	the	context	of	the	
broader,	and	ultimately	opposing,	positions	in	discourse	adopted	by	the	legal	
parties.	Thus,	the	analysis	has	progressed	from	a	preliminary	focus	on	the	
pragmatic	strategies	of	spoken	discourse,	exploring	amongst	other	things	speech	
acts,	echoic	mention	and	mock	impoliteness,	into	a	broader	assessment	of	the	
development,	as	narrative,	of	the	discursive	event	itself	and	of	the	different	
perspectives	and	experiences	of	each	participant	in	the	event.	The	exploration	of	
narrativisation	drew	on	models	of	modality	and	Text	World	Theory	and	was	
especially	concerned	with	the	legal	system’s	conceptual	mind‐modelling	of	the	
participants	Ferdinand,	Terry	and	Cole.	Of	particular	interest	was	the	transition	
from	the	magistrate’s	mind‐modelling	and	character	construction	into	the	
discourse	of	the	FAJGT	document,	which	rejects	the	earlier	assessment	of	LWMC	
and	which	concludes,	on	the	balance	of	probability,	that	Terry’s	intention	was	after	
all	to	insult	and	that	his	utterance	was	racially	aggravated.	Moreover,	as	it	
develops,	the	narrative	becomes	progressively	more	self‐reflexive	and	meta‐
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discoursal.	For	instance,	the	epistemic	distance	embodied	in	the	LWMC	ruling	is	
addressed	head‐on	by	the	FA,	where	a	series	of	categorical	assertions	sit	in	
counterpoint	to	the	perceived	lack	of	confidence	in	magistrate	Riddle’s	assessment	
of	Terry’s	credibility.		
	 It	is	suggested	throughout	this	article	that	the	discursive	event	that	is	R	v	
John	Terry	is	situated	at	the	confluence	between	language,	discourse	and	society,	
and,	moreover,	that	it	is	obfuscated	by	relations	of	power	and	authority	through	
the	media	and	the	law.	We	also	acknowledge	that	the	event	is	further	suffused	by	
both	issues	of	race	and	by	perceptions	of	nationhood	embraced	by	contemporary	
football	culture.	As	noted,	Terry	was	the	then	captain	of	the	English	national	
football	team.	Anton	Ferdinand	is	the	brother	of	Rio	Ferdinand,	another	high‐
profile	international	footballer	who	was	regularly	vice‐captain,	and	once	selected	
to	be	captain,	of	the	same	national	side.	An	injury	to	Rio	Ferdinand	in	2010	meant	
that	Terry	was	re‐instated	as	permanent	England	captain.	However,	the	possible	
allegiances	of	Ashley	Cole	are	more	complex	again:	a	black	footballer	and	member	
of	the	same	national	side,	but	a	member	of	the	same	club	side	as	Terry	and	one	
who	offered	corroborating	evidence	for	his	teammate.	This	created	a	deeply	
problematic	schism	for	the	institution	of	English	football	and	its	governing	body,	
with	pressure	both	to	reproduce	and	maintain	social,	cultural	and	ethnic	cohesion,	
but	to	investigative	robustly	any	event	that	might	be	construed	as	racist,	and	
certainly,	any	event	that	might	constitute	a	racially	aggravated	public	order	
offence.		
	 The	positions	adopted	in	this	discursive	event	were	arguably	atypical	in	
that	they	were	cross‐cut	by	the	competing	concerns	of	race,	colour,	and	allegiance	
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to	club	and	country.	Unsurprisingly,	these	positions	were	compounded	by	the	
mediated	reaction	and	commentary	of	football	supporters,	through	blogs,	tweets	
and	other	social	media.	Although	we	have	no	solid	empirical	evidence	at	this	stage,	
a	trend	seemed	to	be	that	the	hostility	and	abuse	directed	towards	Terry	on	social	
media	was	in	direct	proportion	to	the	degree	of	perceived	rivalry	between	his	and	
other	clubs.	It	was	probably	no	coincidence	therefore	that	two	fans	of	rival	London	
club	West	Ham	were	arrested	during	a	match	against	Chelsea	in	March	2013,	for	
alleged	coin	throwing	and	for	other	verbal	abuse	directed	towards	Terry.	
	 There	is	no	doubt	then	that	the	case	of	R	v	John	Terry	captured	the	public	
imagination,	in	the	sense	that	it	was	played	out	extensively	through	the	discourse	
of	sports	pundits,	football	supporters	and	social	commentators.	Like	Bishop	and	
Jaworski	(2003),	we	are	interested	in	the	discursive	and	representational	practices	
(in	sport)	through	which	modern	nations	are	imagined.	However,	where	Bishop	
and	Jaworski	explore	feelings	of	national	belonging,	the	outcome	of	our	study	has	
been	more	to	do	with	a	sense	of	national	disjunction	that	followed	in	the	wake	of	
this	episode.	Moreover,	the	findings	of	the	present	article	do	suggest	that	football	
authorities	have	considerable	ground	to	make	up	when	dealing	in	a	consistent	and	
transparent	manner	with	alleged	racism.	For	instance,	Christenson	(2012)	notes	
that	in	instances	of	confirmed	racist	abuse	by	fans	of	national	sides,	the	average	
fine	imposed	by	European	governing	body	UEFA	is	around	£15,000.	
Contextualising	the	paucity	of	such	fines,	Christenson	(2012:	2)	comments	
acerbically	on	the	case	of	Danish	international	footballer	Nicklas	Bendtner,	who	
celebrated	a	goal	by	revealing	‘unapproved’	underwear	displaying	the	logo	of	an	
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Irish	betting	chain.	Banned	from	a	subsequent	world	cup	qualifier,	Bendtner’s	fine	
for	such	‘improper	conduct’	was	£80,000.		
	 In	sum,	it	is	hoped	that	the	synthesis	in	this	article	of	linguistic	pragmatics,	
discourse	analysis	and	cognitive	linguistics	enables	a	fuller	understanding	of	the	
discursive	event	that	played	out	as	R	v	John	Terry.	The	various	theoretical	models	
employed	here	have	probed	different	aspects	of	its	transformation	in	discourse,	
from	football	field	through	to	the	FA	verdict.	It	is	has	been	our	contention	that	the	
event	constitutes	a	complex	web	of	linguistic	structures	and	strategies	in	
discourse,	best	approached	with	a	broad	range	of	analytic	tools.	At	the	core	of	the	
analysis	has	been	a	focus	on	the	discursively	enigmatic	assumption	that	racist	
words	may	be	used	by	a	speaker	who	is	not	racist.	Finally,	it	is	hoped	that	the	
present	study	complements	the	growing	body	of	research	work	in	critical	
discourse	studies	that	explores	the	intersection	between	discourse,	sport	and	
culture.	
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